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Abstract
The US Government’s decision in 2003 to allow embedded journalists to cover the war in Iraq 
represented a significant change in the attitude of military commanders to their relationship with 
journalists. This marked the end of four decades of anti-media sentiment. The new relationship was 
predicated on the understanding that the media has the capacity to shape public attitudes towards the 
conflict. This paper explores whether the US military’s strategy, which was underpinned by a desire 
that the media produce positive coverage, worked. It also explores whether objectivity, a journalistic 
staple, is a victim of such a policy.
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Introduction
In March 2003, U.S. and allied military forces invaded Iraq with the expressed 
purpose	of	deposing	its	president,	Saddam	Hussein,	and	liberating	the	Iraqi	people	
from his tyrannical rule.  The impetus for such actions was framed in terms of the 
ongoing United States’ war on terrorism, begun after the September 11, 2001 attacks 
on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon by Al-Qaeda terrorists.  At 
the time, the United States government argued that there were links between Iraqi 
President	Saddam	Hussein	and	Osama	bin	Laden,	the	leader	of	Al-Qaeda,	and	that	
President	Hussein	possessed	a	significant	and	threatening	stockpile	of	weapons	of	mass	
destruction that he could use to attack the United States within a moment’s notice.
This war is significant for a number of structural and doctrinal changes that took 
place with it.  First, President Bush employed a new U.S. foreign policy doctrine, 
known as the Bush Doctrine, that allowed the president, “to describe its decision to 
attack first, without an overt act of…provocation” in cases where there are perceived 
direct	threats	to	the	United	States	(Rampton	and	Sauber,	2003:	126).		This	war	also	
saw an important structural change in the relationship between military and media, 
called embedded journalism, described as “military jargon for a reporter who is to be 
stationed with a ‘unit’” (Gay, 2003: A16).
Throughout the formal period of war, beginning in early March 2003, and to a lesser 
extent after the formal war was concluded several weeks later, certain journalists 
were allowed to travel with military units and to independently publish their work 
with	minimal	military	or	government	censorship	and	scrutiny.		Recent	technological	
advancements that made reporting from the field possible in desert conditions were 
partly responsible for this newly conceived access, but perhaps more importantly, 
according	to	Rampton	and	Stauber,	it	resulted	from	the	realisation	of	tension	between	
military and media, and the idea that “media coverage of any…operation will, to a large 
extent, shape public perception” (p. 185).  Such realisations substantially altered “nearly 
four decades of anti-media sentiment” within the military establishment, motivating the 
Department of Defense to put forth this savvier doctrine (Gay, 2003: 16).
Verne Gay (2003) writes that “embeds potentially could give millions of viewers a 
front-row seat to the war, live and uncut…you need only consult your…history book 
to know that nothing like this has ever happened” (p. 16).  In practice embedded 
journalists produced dramatic news and imagery consisting of first-hand accounts of 
battles, explosions, human suffering, military success and defeat.  Embedded journalists 
interviewed soldiers and commanders about ongoing battles and situations and 
reported	observations	about	the	war,	Iraqi	civilians	and	military	personnel.		Here	were	
reporters with very limited contact and information about the larger war going on 
around them. They reported what they saw and felt.  Embedded journalists were tied 
to their sources -- the U.S. military commanders and personnel with whom they were 
embedded.  Though they produced interesting, dramatic and exciting coverage, the 
merit and long-term implications of embedding journalists are still to be established.
 In light of this new form of war journalism, it is important to understand how 
embedding journalists alters the way that a conflict is covered as news, and the impact 
that such coverage can have on news consumers.  This study will attempt to explore 
answers to the first of these two questions.  According to media scholar Marvin Kalb, 
embedding journalists was an attempt by the Department of Defense to ensure “proud, 
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positive, patriotic coverage” of the war (p. 34).  It is worth testing whether the DoD’s 
plan played out.
Literature Review
Previous attempts to analyse the military/media relationship have been numerous 
and diversity exists in both methodology and conclusions.  One factor contributing 
to this diversity is the shifting character of the relationship between the media and 
the military over time.  The long relationship between military and media has led to 
frustration on both sides, as well as among the public. According to Greg McLaughlin:
One of the most enduring myths in the recent history of war reporting is the 
‘Vietnam Syndrome,’ the widespread belief that the mainstream American 
media were opposed to the Vietnam War and openly hostile to the US military 
and its South Vietnamese clients; and that as a result of their critical coverage 
they lost the war for the U.S. (p. 73).
  This type of thinking has prevailed within the military since the Vietnam War, 
contributing to public relations counter-campaigns such as those in which journalists 
“who	questioned	any	aspect	of	official	policy	[were]	[labelled]	at	best	‘a	liberal,’	at	
worst a ‘communist’”(p. 75).  In subsequent military operations, the military has 
attempted to manage media access and content. In the 1983 invasion of Granada, 
for instance, “the military excluded the news media from their immediate area of 
operations,” (p. 84) and, as Douglas Kellner writes, in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, 
“the Bush administration and the Pentagon produced a barrage of propaganda, 
disinformation, and outright lies that covered over the more unsavory aspects of the 
Gulf War and that legitimated U.S. policies” (p. 1).  Meanwhile, journalists covering 
the Persian Gulf War were relegated to closely guarded press pools and allowed only 
limited access to military action.
The military’s emphasis on secrecy, safety, and message management and its belief in 
the media’s potential negative effect on war have tended to lead military leadership to 
look skeptically on the work of war reporters.  Similarly, reporters’ attempts to unearth 
sensational stories and their drive for better ratings and circulation have historically 
created negative sentiments in the military.  Through embedding, this was all supposed 
to change.  In February, 2003 Conor O’Clery, a journalist for the Irish Times, suggested 
that	US	military	leadership	“sees	[embedding]	as	an	improvement	on	the	pool	system	
used in the 1991 Gulf War, when a pool reporter would be taken to the ‘front’ and 
would share his material”.
A central factor of many critiques of the media/military relationship is the question of 
objectivity.  In war journalism, objectivity comes under increased pressure.  According 
to Gregory McLaughlin (2002), journalistic coverage of war is limited by “military 
security,	[and]	standards	of	taste	and	decency	with	respect	to	pictures	of	dead	and	
wounded,” as well as the journalist’s political and patriotic allegiances and personal 
feelings about a war’s justification (p. 80).  In extreme cases journalists have crossed the 
line and become combatants on one side or another of a conflict (p. 155).
Embedded journalists in Iraq were attacked along with their regiments:  they were in 
harm’s	way.	Kalb	writes	that	embedded	journalists	“[were]	on	the	firing	line,	facing	
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the	same	sandstorms,	fearing	chemical	attacks	from	a	desperate	Saddam	Hussein,	
experiencing	many	of	the	same	dangers.	They	[had]	been	warned	that	their	casualty	
rates may be higher than in earlier conflicts” (p. 34).    As suggested by Newsweek 
reporter	Jonathan	Alter	(2003)	before	the	war:“if	[journalists]	endanger	the	unit,	they	
know	they’re	endangering	themselves.”		He	writes:	“if	you	travel	with	a	group	over	
a period of weeks, especially one that is providing you protection from chemical or 
biological attack, you’re more likely to stay loyal to the people you’re with.”  This 
feature of embedded journalism, in which journalists forge relationships of dependence 
and safety with the subjects of their stories, can significantly affect a journalist’s 
objectivity.  Critics of journalistic objectivity/subjectivity during the war are supported 
by journalists’ own accounts of self-censorship, friendly reporting, and complying with 
military wishes that they not report particular aspects of the conflict.
The theoretical bases for this study include those which pertain to the two related 
concepts	of	objectivity	and	patriotism.		Principal	among	these	is	Herman	and	
Chomsky’s (1988) notion of manufacturing consent, in which the authors contend 
that media content is influenced by five factors, including “reliance of the media on 
information	provided	by	government…	[and]	‘anticommunism’	as	a	national	religion	
and control mechanism”(p. 2).  Because of the fall of the Soviet Union and the end 
of the Cold War, anticommunism is no longer the norm to which American political 
and social life subscribe.  I contend that the concept could easily be replaced with 
“antiterrorism,” one of the strongest factors cited as contributing to the decision 
to	proceed	with	this	war.		Herman	and	Chomsky’s	concepts	speak	to	the	powerful	
influences that source, personal and political pressure can have on objectivity.
While	Herman	and	Chomsky’s	theory	is	relevant	to	all	journalism,	a	second	theoretical	
question, the “fog of war,” speaks more directly to the dilemma of embedded 
journalists.  Journalism scholar Greg McLaughlin argues that “objectivity is based on 
the assumption that a series of ‘facts’ or truth claims about the world can be validated 
by the rules and procedures of a professional community” (2002: 161).  In order to 
mitigate the effects of propaganda and bias, journalists “put the emphasis of coverage 
on reporting and gathering facts” (p. 158).  Against this, Brent MacGregor (1997) uses 
the term “fog of war” to describe a situation in which journalists covering a war zone 
“can be surprisingly isolated, having only their individual point of view on events 
which can in fact be limited by the very proximity and unique perspective which 
makes their reports valuable” (p. 55).
According to the fog of war thesis, combat reporters, isolated and dependent on 
limited resources, will sometimes report skewed and inconsistent information.  A 
corollary argument is made by McLaughlin, who questions journalists’ capacity for 
objectivity related to “propaganda from…their own side: their unwillingness to 
challenge reporting restrictions, their enjoyment of the razzmatazz of the briefings and 
their susceptibility to disinformation and dissemblage, and their failure to corroborate 
source information against alternative material” (p. 101).  Though written before 
the Iraq war, McLaughlin’s and MacGregor’s ideas are relevant to the current study: 
objectivity can be further challenged by embedding U.S. journalists with U.S. military 
units because of their limited vision in the war zone and their propensity to accept 
statements made by representatives of their own side.
The embedded journalist is therefore a potential victim of subjectivity from within 
and without. Their personal proclivity to support their side in times of war combined 
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with their limited vision trends their coverage toward subjective, pro-U.S. accounts of 
the	war.		Added	to	these	are	the	organisational	factors	cited	by	Herman	and	Chomsky	
and,	as	suggested	by	such	journalism	critics	as	Sheldon	Rampton	and	John	Stauber	
(2003), the tendency of U.S. news organisations since September 11, 2001, to take 
on a more patriotic tone (p. 171).  Finally, the structural factors that influence all 
journalism should play a role in the embedded journalists’ coverage of the war, which 
means it will tend toward sensationalism and reinforce dominant American themes 
(pro-democracy, pro-western).
Methodology
This quantitative research was intended as a preliminary and exploratory study, aimed 
at discerning if there are quantifiable differences in war coverage, depending on the 
location of the reporter, and the reporter’s relation to the military (i.e. embedded or 
not).  This study was limited to the analysis of embedded journalists writing for the 
Washington Post, a well-respected newspaper that is known for journalistic quality and 
its nationwide appeal. The Washington Post was an ideal choice for this project because 
in addition to its 11 embedded journalists, the Washington Post covered the war from a 
variety of other locations around the globe, including inside Iraq (non-embedded). The 
Washington Post is distributed both nationally and internationally, so its opportunity for 
influence is significant.
The project’s sample was developed randomly from the entire body of Washington Post 
articles published during the period of formal war, between the period of 20 March 
and 1 May 2003.  From this date-range, 10 days were randomly selected and every 
non-editorial Washington Post article that mentioned the term “Iraq” within its text 
was collected, for a total of 395 articles.
The content of the articles was analysed in conjunction with data pertaining to the 
journalist’s physical location to determine whether differences in coverage biases were 
evident	between	journalists	in	different	geographic	locations	and	situations.	However,	
because the concepts of patriotism and objectivity are somewhat amorphous and 
without clear operational capacity, it was necessary to define these terms through the 
analysis of related concepts and through assessment of the author’s tone.
Operational definitions were developed to quantify journalists’ presentation of 
concepts related to the war.  The following represents these definitions:
1.	 President	George	Bush	and	Cabinet	–	Includes	Mr.	Bush,	his	closest	advisors	
and aides.
2.	 U.S.	Military	Administration	and	Operation	–	References	to	large-scale	troop	
deployments, movements and successes.  This category also includes references to 
how the military was prepared for warfare, and its treatment of Iraqi civilians.
3.	 U.S.	Military	Soldiers	–This	category	included	small	groups	of	soldiers,	
individual soldiers and relations between soldiers and civilians.
4.	 President	Saddam	Hussein	–	All	references	to	the	deposed	Iraqi	leader.
5.	 Iraqi	Governmental	and	Military	Administration	and	Operation 
–	Unlike	the	U.S.	government,	where	there	are	clear	distinctions	between	
governmental and military leadership, this distinction was difficult to make 
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regarding the Iraqi leadership. I therefore included all Iraqi leadership (excluding 
Hussein)	in	this	category.		This	also	included	references	to	Iraq’s	war	effort,	
various military organisations, large troop deployments, and atrocities that were 
attributed to the military or governmental organisations.
6. Iraqi Military Soldiers	–	Any	reference	to	Iraqi	soldiers	and	their	activity	(not	
including	official/administrative	activity).	Refers	mostly	to	day-to-day	interaction	
with Iraqis in battle.
Other categories:  Osama bin Laden/Al Qaeda, President Chirac/France, U.S. 
government leadership, post-war planning and events, American public, Iraqi 
public, war protesters, and mass media.
 The categories were analysed in each paragraph of every article, to determine if the 
author’s reference to each was favorable, neutral, or unfavorable (using a 3 point scale 
in	which	1=unfavorable,	2=neutral	and	3=favorable).		The	average	score	of	each	article	
containing a reference to a concept was then calculated and recorded. Intercoder 
reliability was achieved with the help of a colleague at the University of Colorado at 
Boulder, using Scott’s Pi formulation.  The average Scott’s Pi score was .88 and ranged 
between .64 for Iraqi Soldiers, and 1 for Osama Bin Laden, Iraqi Military, Post-War 
Planning, the US Public and Protesters.
Based on the concepts indicated above, the research was directed toward elucidating 
the following hypotheses about journalists’ coverage of the war:
Hypotheses:
H1:	 U.S.	embedded	journalists’	coverage	of	U.S.	military	soldiers	and	leadership	will	
tend to be more favorable than the coverage of those U.S. journalists who are not 
embedded.
H2:	 U.S.	embedded	journalists’	coverage	of	Iraqi	soldiers	will	be	less	favorable	than	
the coverage of those U.S. journalists who are not embedded.
H3:	 U.S.	embedded	journalists’	coverage	will	be	less	favorable	toward	President	
Saddam	Hussein	and	the	Iraqi	military	establishment	than	the	coverage	of	
non-embedded U.S. journalists.
H4:	 Due	to	proximity,	U.S.	embedded	journalists	will	portray	the	U.S.	government’s	
actions and decision-making less favorably than the coverage of non-embedded 
U.S.	journalists.	Note:	I	expect	H4	to	prove	a	null	hypothesis:
If the first hypothesis is correct, articles by embedded journalists will have relatively 
higher levels of favorability for the U.S. military. Similarly, if hypotheses 2 and 3 are 
correct, articles by embedded journalists should display relatively unfavorably accounts 
of Iraqi leadership, military and soldiers.  Finally, if null-hypothesis 4 is correct, all articles 
written within the period, regardless of where the journalist was stationed, should display 
similarly high favorability for support of the war and the U.S. government.
The relative levels of favorability for each category should clearly indicate the 
degree to which each article is biased toward U.S. patriotism. This information, 
when combined with data about the author’s location, should indicate whether their 
locations or their embeddness played a role in the way that reporter portrayed the war.
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Results
The data display a general trend toward neutrality in all Washington Post articles 
related to the Iraq War during the period of formal warfare.  In nearly all categories, 
favorability hovered around neutral, with the most favorable coverage concerning the 
U.S. soldiers (2.29), and the least favorable for Osama bin Laden (1.37).  Within this 
overall neutrality, there were statistically significant differences between embedded 
and non-embedded journalists for several variables tested in this project.  Additional 
differences were observable between journalists, depending on their regional locations.
Of the articles in the sample, 51 (12.9%) were written by embedded journalists.  This 
represents the largest proportion of articles written outside of the United States.  Of 
the remaining 344, 276 were written within the United States, 15 were written in 
Europe, 14 in the Middle East, and 39 by journalists in Iraq who were not embedded.
Hypothesis 1
Observations were made about the differences between embedded and non-embedded 
journalists’ presentations in two categories; the U.S. military leadership and operation, 
and U.S. soldiers.  The sample revealed 250 stories dealing with the U.S. military (46 
embedded, and 204 non-embedded) and 174 stories about U.S. soldiers (39 embedded, 135 
non-embedded).  Using a T-test, significant differences were found between embedded and 
non-embedded journalists covering the first category: U.S. military and operation (Table 1).  
Coverage of the U.S. military among embedded reporters was 2.28, while non-embedded 
reporters’ portrayal was 1.98 (.35 less).  Embedded journalists tended to cover the U.S. 
military leadership and operation more favorably than non-embedded journalists.  The 
rationale for this relationship became clearer when journalist’s specific locations (embedded, 
in Iraq but not embedded, in the Middle East, in Europe, and in the United States) were 
compared.  While the most favorable coverage of the U.S. military and operation came 
from embedded journalists, a statistically significant relationship to embedded journalists 
was with journalists in Iraq who were not embedded.  Where embedded journalists 
covered U.S. military leadership with average 2.28 favorability, non-embedded journalists in 
Iraq expressed favorability of 1.83, a difference of .45.
Regarding	favorability	toward	U.S.	soldiers,	there	were	no	statistically	significant	
relationships, regardless of whether journalists were embedded or not, or related to 
their location. Embedded journalists’ average coverage tended to be slightly more 
favorable than others, but not statistically significantly so.  Journalists in all locations 
presented	U.S.	soldiers	favorably	(mean	=	2.29).
Hypothesis	1,	regarding	the	question	of	whether	embeddedness	affects	coverage	of	the	
U.S. military leadership and operation, and of soldiers, was only partially supported.  
While coverage did differ for half the operational categories (U.S. military leadership 
operation), coverage of U.S. soldiers was constant and favorable, regardless of the 
journalist’s location or embeddedness.
Hypothesis 2
There were 94 articles containing references to Iraqi soldiers.  Thirty were written 
by embedded journalists, 64 by non-embedded journalists. Coverage of Iraqi 
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soldiers during the war was generally negative, averaging 1.70 overall.  Using 
T-tests, a statistically significant difference was discovered between embedded and 
non-embedded journalists covering Iraqi soldiers (Table 2).  Embedded journalists 
averaged slightly less favorable coverage (1.52) than non-embedded journalists (1.80).  
Between locations, the most favorable coverage came from those in Europe, but none 
were more favorable than neutral (2.00).
	 Hypothesis	2	is	therefore	verified	by	the	data.		Embeddedness	apparently	did	affect	
journalists’ relative levels of favorability with regard to Iraqi soldiers.  As hypothesised, 
embedded journalists depicted Iraqi soldiers less favorably than those who were not 
embedded, though all journalists portrayed Iraqi soldiers unfavorably.
Hypothesis 3
Coverage	of	Iraq’s	disposed	president,	Saddam	Hussein,	was	generally	negative,	
regardless	of	the	journalist’s	location.		Of	171	articles	in	which	Mr.	Hussein	was	
mentioned, 27 were by embedded journalists, and 144 were not.  Average level of 
favorability was 1.41, and there were no statistically significant differences between 
embedded	and	non-embedded	journalists’	coverage	of	Mr.	Hussein.		There	were	
no statistically significant differences depending on the journalist’s location, though 
the most favorable coverage (1.63) came from journalists in the Middle East, and 
journalists	in	Europe	covered	Mr.	Hussein	least	favorably	(1.25).
Of the 118 articles that mentioned the Iraqi military establishment, 29 were by 
embedded journalists, and 89 were written by others.  The difference between 
embedded and non-embedded journalists covering the Iraqi military establishment was 
statistically significant.  Embedded journalists tended to cover the Iraqi military less 
favorably (1.36) than non-embedded journalists (1.64) (Table 3).  This relationship also 
was observable using a T-test to compare the means of embedded and non-embedded 
journalists in Iraq.  Between these groups, there was a difference in means of .30 
(p<.05).  Embedded journalists covered the Iraq military with an average favorability 
of 1.36.  Non-embedded journalists in Iraq covered them at 1.66 favorability.
Hypothesis	3,	like	Hypothesis	1,	proved	to	be	only	partially	supported.		Within	
the	hypothesis,	one	of	two	questions	proved	true.		Coverage	of	President	Hussein,	
regardless of the journalist’s location, was negative.  Embeddedness did prove to be a 
factor in favorability of the Iraqi military establishment.  As hypothesised, embedded 
journalists depicted the Iraqi military less favorably than those not embedded.
Hypothesis 4
As	mentioned	previously,	Hypothesis	4	was	expected	to	test	null.		Given	the	theoretical	
bases for this project, American journalists should express similarly favorable portrayals 
of U.S. governmental leadership and decision-making.  As expected, embedded and 
non-embedded journalists covering this topic did not display statistically significant 
differences in their coverage of either President Bush or the U.S. government.  There 
were significant differences in the quantity of coverage for both factors (for President 
Bush, embedded journalists produced 17 of 230 articles, and for the U.S. government, 
embedded journalists produced 2 of 77).  Coverage among both embedded and 
non-embedded journalists expressed similar favorability however, in both categories.
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For President Bush, average favorability was 1.74.  Although embedded versus 
non-embedded journalists’ coverage was not significantly different, there was a 
statistically significant difference in coverage of President Bush based on location.  The 
most favorable coverage of President Bush was written by embedded journalists (1.85) 
and the least favorable by those in Europe (1.42) (Graph 1).  Mean favorability for the 
U.S. government was 2.00.  Though not significantly so, like President Bush, the U.S. 
government enjoyed the most favorability from embedded journalists (2.3).  The least 
favorable coverage came from journalists in the Middle East (1.66).
As expected, hypothesis 4 proved to be null.  Coverage of both President Bush and 
the U.S. government between embedded and non-embedded journalists proved to 
be similar, though Mr. Bush’s favorability was significantly different based on author 
location.  Interestingly, coverage of Mr. Bush did not adhere to the theoretical 
conceptions for this paper, and was overall negative.
In addition to those categories that I used to directly test the hypotheses, I developed 
a number of secondary categories to test for factors surrounding the war and related 
to patriotism that were not hypothesised.  One question, for instance, was whether 
coverage would be different depending on the article’s placement within the 
newspaper.  I therefore tested whether being on the front page, a section front, or in 
another location would make significant differences in coverage.  With the exception 
of Iraqi soldiers, who were portrayed more favorably on section fronts (2.33) than in 
other places in the newspaper (1.61), the results of this query were not significant.
Because during this war the lines were sometimes blurred between Iraqi soldiers and 
Iraqi civilians, I also tested journalists’ favorability toward Iraqi citizens.  Between 
embedded and non-embedded journalists, and between journalists in different 
locations, no significant relationships were discovered.  Average coverage tended to 
be neutral/favorable (2.09), with the most favorable coverage coming from those 
journalists in Europe (2.33), and the least favorable coverage coming from journalists 
in Iraq but not embedded (1.95).
Another interesting topic during this war was the role of dissenters and protesters.  
These include protesters within and outside the United States, as well as some 
prominent statesmen, including French President Jacques Chirac.  In order to gauge 
how such factors were portrayed in Washington Post coverage, I included operational 
categories for Mr. Chirac and war protesters.  War protesters were treated consistently 
negative by journalists regardless of their location.  Journalists in Iraq and embedded 
journalists tended to express more favorable impressions of protesters, but these 
only represented three of 54 total articles on the topic.  Average favorability for war 
protesters was 1.87.
President Jacques Chirac was only portrayed by journalists in the United States and 
in Europe.  There was a statistically significant relationship between these two groups’ 
portrayals of Mr. Chirac, with journalists in Europe portraying him more favorably 
than those in the United States by a margin of .64.  European journalists portrayed the 
French president with a favorability of 2.31.  It is worth noting that only 20 articles 
portrayed the French president at all, and only 4 of those were written in Europe.  The 
remaining 16 were written in the United States, with an average favorability of 1.67.
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Many of the journalists covering the war, perhaps because they were aware of the 
changes that were supposedly taking place in the military-media relationship, also 
mentioned mass media itself in their coverage.  I therefore endeavored to quantify this 
portrayal, to examine the way that media represented itself.  Non-embedded journalists 
covered media more often than embedded journalists at a rate of 7:1.  Coverage, 
however, was not significantly different depending on embeddedness.  Average 
coverage of media was 1.87, slightly less than favorable.
Conclusions/Discussion
Evidence presented in this study indicates that the embedded journalism project was a 
good decision on the part of the U.S. government and military.  Overall, in categories 
that would indicate support for the conflict and support for participants on the side of 
the United States, favorability was higher among embedded journalists than among those 
who were not.  When looking at journalists with regards to their locations, it is clear that 
journalists in the United States and journalists who were embedded presented the most 
favorable coverage.  In terms of improving the favorability of coverage from journalists 
who were in and around the war, the embedded journalism project was a success.
Despite the evidence that supports the assertion that Washington Post journalists who 
were embedded produced more favorable coverage of the war than others, another 
trend is revealed in the data: that coverage of the war, in general, and even among 
embedded journalists, was not particularly favorable.  The most striking example is 
favorability toward President Bush.  Total mean favorability for Mr. Bush was only 
1.73 (Table 5).  Journalists who were embedded favored Mr. Bush at a rate of 1.85, 
and non-embedded journalists’ favorability was only 1.72.  There were no locations 
tested in this project in which Mr. Bush received average favorable coverage.  There 
are a number of possible explanations for this trend including the media’s perceived 
watchdog role, and the possibility that U.S. military leadership is correct in its assertion 
that journalistic coverage of war tends to be negative.
This data presented about Mr. Bush suggests a question that is fundamental to this 
project: whether objectivity can be tested through analysis of journalists’ favorability 
toward the war.  The data about President Bush can be interpreted in a number of 
ways, including as representing objectivity, but the relationship is not conclusive.  
Embedded journalists’ improved favorability toward the war and Mr. Bush may be a 
function of their relationships with their military units, as a reflection of improved 
access to the newsmakers or, just as justifiably, as a function of their lack of access to 
other aspects of the war.  While the research is suggestive of a relationship between 
objectivity and favorability, this relationship is indeterminable in the context of this 
study based solely on news content.
Having	said	that,	the	research	does	elucidate	some	interesting	and	important	
information about the embedded journalism project.  One could look to this study for 
information	about	the	theories	that	underpin	it.		The	data	provide	support	for	Herman	
and Chomsky’s theories about objectivity and corporate media/government/military 
ties.		Herman	and	Chomsky	assert	that	journalists	are	more	likely	to	favor	official	
government sources than other sources.  As this study shows, more favorable coverage 
emerged from embedded journalists than from those who were not embedded.  
Assuming that the government and military sources to which the embedded 
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journalists were assigned were favorably disposed toward themselves and their mission, 
the data indicate this theory holds true.
A	second	of	Herman	and	Chomsky’s	theories	that	was	adapted	and	used	in	this	project	
was anticommunism, (which I turned into antiterrorism).  Terrorism being a cultural 
enemy, the theory indicates that journalists will be predisposed toward antiterrorist 
themes in their coverage, and will disparage those who practice terrorism.  This idea 
appeared to be supported by the data through the null hypothesis.  Overall, coverage 
of	Osama	bin	Laden	and	Saddam	Hussein	was	negative,	regardless	of	embeddedness	or	
journalist location.  While the concept does not fit into the hypothetical relationship 
between relative levels of favorability based on embeddedness, the data appear to 
reflect	Herman	and	Chomsky’s	original	conception,	that	American	journalists	would	
express unfavorability toward terrorist forces, groups, people and ideas in all cases, and 
support for those people and organisations that fight it.
Returning	again	to	the	question	of	objectivity,	this	project’s	data	revealed	more	
favorable coverage from embedded journalists than from others, bringing into 
question the theoretical conception of the fog of war.  Accepting, for the moment, 
the correspondence between favorability and objectivity, it could be argued that the 
fog of war that has been used to criticise journalistic coverage of war was lifted by 
embedding journalism, simply because journalists now have more access to some 
types of information than they had before.  This would be supported by findings that 
favorability	was	higher	among	embedded	journalists	than	others.		However,	this	data	
could equally appropriately describe the furthering of the fog of war as a function of 
journalists, physically and emotionally connected with their sources, reflecting their 
sources’ feelings about the conflict in their coverage.  The data could similarly support 
the conclusion that the difference in embedded journalists’ coverage reflected a lack 
of access to types of information other than that provided by their military hosts.  
The second and third of these assertions are more strongly validated by the data than 
the first.  If, for instance, embedded journalists’ favorability had gone down or had 
oscillated more between variables, it would be more suggestive of the first assertion 
because it would indicate a counter-intuitive relationship in which the journalists 
could	be	shown	to	think	and	report	more	freely.		However,	the	across-the-board	more	
positive coverage appears symptomatic of the third assertion, which is most strongly 
related	to	the	fog	of	war	theory	–	that	embedded	journalists’	coverage	reflected	limited	
perspective	and	information.		However,	the	data	could	also	suggest	an	equally	strong	
validation	of	the	second	assertion	–	that	embedded	journalists’	positive	coverage	
reflected an emotional connection with the soldiers.
As noted previously, this project was conceived and pursued preliminarily.  Foregoing 
comprehensiveness, the project aimed toward an initial exploration of embedded 
journalism	–	questioning	whether	or	not	the	need	exists	for	future	study.		It	was	
therefore limited; first, although the embedded journalism project was intended at least 
in part for television journalism, this project looks only at those journalists writing 
for newspapers.  This decision necessarily limits the scope of the project in that it 
excludes a significant segment of embedded journalists and, more importantly, the 
visual aspects of the embedded journalists’ coverage.  Second, the project was limited 
to the Washington Post, one of several national newspapers that participated in the 
embedded journalism project.  Such a decision calls into question the differentiation 
that may have existed between journalists working for different media outlets.  Finally, 
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as a consequence of the random sampling method, there were a smaller number of 
embedded articles than was desired.  A different sampling method would provide more 
data for analysis, thus more firmly establishing the grounds for comparison.  Future 
research in this area should therefore endeavor first to look into the question of 
objectivity and favorability from the perspective of television news.  The added visual 
element may prove significant to coverage of the war.  Second, as other news sources 
may have made entirely different editorial and programmatic choices that could have 
changed the journalists’ portrayals; future research should be aimed toward analysis 
that occurs across media outlets.  Third, research should work to compare embedded 
coverage across media platforms (comparing television and newspapers, for instance).  
Finally, other sampling methods should be explored to create appropriately large 
quantity of data from embedded sources.
Finally, an important question that this project does not intend to address is the 
question of effects.  We have seen how embedded journalists from the Washington Post 
covered the war differently than those who were not embedded.  The next logical 
question is whether or not such differences had any influence on readers’ perceptions 
of the war.  True, the difference in coverage was minimal and tended in most cases 
toward neutrality, but some would argue that neutral coverage is tacit approval.  In 
order to really understand whether or not the embedded journalism project was a 
success, it would be important to observe and consider how such differences played 
out in the hands and minds of the audiences.
Tables/Graphs
Hypothesis	1	‑	Portrayals	of	US	Military	and	US	Soldiers,	embeds	v.	non‑embeds
Embedded? N Mean
US Military Not Embedded 204 1.98
Embedded 46 2.28
US Soldiers Not Embedded 135 2.33
Embedded 39 2.19
Table	1					p<.01
Hypothesis	2	‑	Favorability	toward	Iraqi	Soldiers
embedded? N Mean
Iraqi Soldiers Not Embedded 64 1.8
Embedded 30 1.52
Table	2					p<.05
Hypothesis	3	‑	Favorability	toward	President	Hussein	and	Iraqi	Military
Embedded? N Mean
President	Hussein
Not Embedded 144 1.42
Embedded 27 1.38
Iraq Military Not Embedded 89 1.64
Embedded 29 1.36
Table	3					p<.001
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Hypothesis	4	‑	Favorability	of	President	Jacques	Chirac
Location N Mean
Chirac USA 16 1.67
Europe 4 2.31
Table	4     p<.05
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Table	5:	Descriptive	Statistics
Number of 
stories
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation
Bush 230 1.00 3.00 1.7356 .56497
Hussein 171 1.00 3.00 1.4080 .49575
bin Laden 21 1.00 2.00 1.3767 .46199
Chirac 20 1.00 3.00 1.8000 .55370
US government 77 1.00 3.00 2.0036 .63636
US Military 250 1.00 3.00 2.0318 .61177
Iraq Military 118 1.00 3.00 1.5694 .56626
US Soldiers 174 1.00 3.00 2.2947 .59500
Iraq Soldiers 94 1.00 3.00 1.7096 .59952
Post-war plans 75 1.00 3.00 2.1076 .60566
US Public 81 1.00 3.00 2.2342 .58173
Iraq Public 156 1.00 3.00 2.0917 .59626
Protesters 54 1.00 3.00 1.8787 .45005
Media 77 1.00 3.00 1.8658 .49164
Valid N (listwise) 0
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